University of Texas at El Paso

DigitalCommons@UTEP
Open Access Theses & Dissertations

2014-01-01

Operational Code And Al-Ikhwan: An Assessment
Of The Evolution Of The Muslim Brotherhood's
Operational Code And Possible Public Diplomacy
Options For The United States
Robert Kevin Thomson
University of Texas at El Paso, rkthomson@miners.utep.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.utep.edu/open_etd
Part of the International Relations Commons, and the Islamic Studies Commons
Recommended Citation
Thomson, Robert Kevin, "Operational Code And Al-Ikhwan: An Assessment Of The Evolution Of The Muslim Brotherhood's
Operational Code And Possible Public Diplomacy Options For The United States" (2014). Open Access Theses & Dissertations. 1363.
https://digitalcommons.utep.edu/open_etd/1363

This is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UTEP. It has been accepted for inclusion in Open Access Theses & Dissertations
by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UTEP. For more information, please contact lweber@utep.edu.

OPERATIONAL CODE AND AL-IKHWAN: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE
EVOLUTION OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD’S OPERATIONAL
CODE AND POSSIBLE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY OPTIONS FOR THE
UNITED STATES

ROBERT KEVIN THOMSON
Intelligence and National Security Studies Program

APPROVED:

Larry Valero, Ph.D., Chair

Nikolas Gardner, Ph.D.

Damien Van Puyvelde, Ph.D.

Charles Ambler, Ph.D.
Dean of the Graduate School

Copyright ©

by
Robert Kevin Thomson
2014

Dedication

For Mom and Dad. Thank you for the motivation and encouragement.
For my sister. Thanks for believing in me.
For my grandparents. You are my inspiration.
And for April. Thank you for being my partner in crime.
I love you all immeasurably.

OPERATIONAL CODE AND AL-IKHWAN: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE
EVOLUTION OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD’S OPERATIONAL
CODE AND POSSIBLE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY OPTIONS FOR THE
UNITED STATES
by

ROBERT KEVIN THOMSON

THESIS

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of
The University of Texas at El Paso
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE

Intelligence and National Security Studies Program
THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT EL PASO
December 2014

Acknowledgements
I would like to thank all of the faculty and staff—former and present—at the University
of Texas of El Paso and the National Security Studies Institute who made my time in El Paso one
of the most joyous and memorable experiences of my life. A special thanks to Dr. Armin
Krishnan, who inspired me in my very first semesters in graduate school. To Dr. Damien Van
Puyvelde, who patiently proofread this thesis with a fine tooth comb, and graciously accepted me
as partner on one of his projects. And Dr. Larry Valero, who provided me with innumerable
opportunities. Thank you all!

v

Abstract
The primary aim of this thesis is to provide the reader with a firm understanding of the
evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood’s operational code from the early 2000s to 2013.
Specifically, this research will address and analyze the evolution of the Brotherhood’s political
rhetoric from its historical context to the present. The Brotherhood’s political rhetoric will be
analyzed utilizing Operational Code Analysis. The secondary aim of this research is to provide a
potential framework for policymakers and diplomats to utilize public diplomacy and strategic
communication strategies to engage and constrain the influence of the Brotherhood in a
globalized society. This research discusses three equally important topics in depth: the Egyptian
Muslim Brotherhood, Operational Code Analysis, and Public Diplomacy. Correspondingly, this
thesis has a robust literature review section to provide the reader with substantial understanding
of the topics discussed. The Muslim Brotherhood’s sentiments on three topics (Israel, the
Establishment and the United States) are measured across three separate temporal variables. This
thesis argues that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s operational code has become more
conflictual through each time period observed. There also remains opportunities, particularly for
the United States, to engage the Brotherhood through public diplomacy means.
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1. Introduction
There are very few Islamist movements which can rival the magnitude, reach, and
success of the al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Since its founding in
1928, the Brotherhood has spread to every state in the Islamic world.1 The Muslim Brotherhood
has become the ideological father of several militant Islamic organizations, including: Jamaat
Islamiyah, Islamic Jihad (not to be confused with Islamic Jihad Organization, the predecessor of
Hezbollah), and Hamas. Throughout the twentieth-century, the organization has often been the
major opposition group in many Arab states, establishing several semi-autonomous Brotherhood
organizations in several different countries, including: Syria, Jordan, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, and
Libya. The Muslim Brotherhood has been an illegal organization throughout much of Egypt’s
modern history. More than seven decades after its creation, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood
emerged as the ruling party, however briefly, after the Egyptian Revolution of 2011 and
subsequent 2012 national elections.
For much of its existence the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has been viewed as a
destabilizing force in Egypt and throughout the Middle East region. With its recent victory in
the 2012 Egyptian presidential and parliamentary elections after the Arab Spring, the
organization now represents a legitimate and potentially destabilizing force within the Egyptian
political system. While there has been much research on the history of the Brotherhood and its
founding ideologists, there is little substantive research concerning the Brotherhood’s operational
code during the latter twentieth century and the early twenty-first century. The aim of this thesis
is to examine the Muslim Brotherhood’s operational code through parts of the Mubarak-era to

1

Ziad Munson, “Islamic Mobilization: Social Movement Theory and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,” The
Sociological Quarterly 42, no. 4 (Autumn 2001): 487.
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the present. Specifically, this research will methodically evaluate the philosophical and
instrumental beliefs (operational code) of the Muslim Brotherhood. Subsequently, this research
will empirically evaluate the evolution of the organization’s operational code since the
Parliament Era. In addition to expanding on the research which was originally conducted by
Nathan Leites in 1951 and Alexander George in 1969, the ultimate aim of this project is to
provide a framework for US decision-makers in the realm of public diplomacy by accurately
identifying, describing, and understanding the operational code of the Muslim Brotherhood to
better engage with the organization.2
1.1 RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESIS
The ultimate research question this thesis intends to answer is: how has the operational
code of the Muslim Brotherhood evolved over the last decade? This will be accomplished by
examining the digital formats that the Brotherhood utilizes to communicate its political rhetoric
with respect to three different entities: Israel, the Egyptian security establishment and the United
States. This leads to a secondary research question: how can public diplomacy and strategic
communication strategies assist the United States Government in future diplomatic and nondiplomatic engagements with the Muslim Brotherhood. This thesis posits that because of the
historical context of the Muslim Brotherhood—specifically that the organization has historically
been a pro-Palestinian and anti-Egyptian establishment group—the organization will have the
most cooperative tendencies towards the United States. As such, United States will serve as the
best possibility to act as the intermediary to engage with the organization through modern public
diplomacy strategies.

2

Mark Schafer and Stephen G. Walker, eds., Beliefs and Leadership in World Politics: Methods and Applications of
Operational Code Analysis (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 5-10.
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1.2 STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE AND SIGNIFICANCE
In 1951, Nathan Leites authored a series of monographs for the RAND Corporation
which examined the political conduct of the Soviet Politburo. Recognizing that the Soviet Union
was a major political actor and a potential threat to international security, Leites set out to
examine the plethora of data provided by Bolshevik literature. Leites’ ultimate aim was to
examine the Bolshevik Politburo’s relations with the outside world, rather than internal
relations.3 He was able to evaluate this relationship by creating “systematic formulations” based
on Bolshevik literature, and then creating a meaningful frame of reference—this would form the
basis for operational code theory. Since 1951, most operational code analysis conducted by
academics has focused on traditional and well established state actors. This is natural since
operational code theory was originally established to evaluate the relations between states and
not within them. As such, non-state actors have been traditionally overlooked from this course
of examination of operational code analysis which conventionally analyzed the role of
established state actors. While much research has been conducted on the Muslim Brotherhood’s
ideology, there is no substantive research on the Brotherhood’s operational code. After the
Egyptian 2012 election, the Muslim Brotherhood became a de jure political party, and thus a
legitimate state actor. Operational code analysis allows researchers to quantify the political
rhetoric of an entity. This quantified data provides a powerful frame of reference regarding a
political entity’s propensity for conflict or cooperative resolution, and ideas about “self” and
“others.” This frame of reference, in turn, can help decision makers to formulate a cogent
diplomatic strategy for engaging with the political entity.

3
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In addition to the lack of substantive research on the proposed subject matter, Egypt and
the Middle East are of great strategic importance to the United States Government. The Camp
David Accords and the subsequent 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty solidified the United
States commitment and interest in the region. These treaties helped normalize relations between
Egypt and Israel. But the Muslim Brotherhood has always been vehemently opposed to both of
these treaties.4 In addition to a myriad of other stipulations, the United States is contractually
obligated to provide military aid and economic support to both Israel and Egypt because of the
treaties.5 For the continuation of aid, President Mubarak limited Egyptian political, ideological
and financial support to the Palestinian cause. As a historical supporter of the Palestinian cause,
the Muslim Brotherhood always took umbrage with this lack of support. The Muslim
Brotherhood began sending even more financial support to Palestine which eventually led to the
Brotherhood becoming the ideological father and financier of Hamas in 1987.6 When the
Muslim Brotherhood solidified itself as a legitimate political entity in Egypt in 2011 after the
Arab Spring, it became a timely academic issue to question the future of regional stability and
evaluate the organization’s use of digital and social media.
Egypt is of vital strategic importance to the regional stability in the Middle East. It is the
most populous Arab nation in the Middle East with the largest conventional army. The two
peace treaties, which normalized diplomatic and economic relations between Israel and Egypt,
also greatly contributed to the stability of the region. However, several key members within the
Muslim Brotherhood and the new administration have threatened to re-evaluate Egypt’s position

4

Ehud Eilam, “Egypt: New Government, Old Challennges,” Defense & Security Analysis 28, no. 2 (June, 2012):
190.
5 Ibid.
6 Alison Praegter, The Muslim Brotherhood: From Opposition to Power (London: Saqi Books, 2013), 199.
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on the peace treaties and bring them to referendum within the new parliament.7 Is the
Brotherhood serious about engaging in this type of brinkmanship diplomacy? Is the Brotherhood
truly resolved to disavow the peace treaties? Despite the recent 2013 coup, the Muslim
Brotherhood still remains a legitimate and powerful state-level actor. An examination of the
Muslim Brotherhood’s operational code analysis can glean potentially valuable information on
the political psychology of the organization and its decision making process by exposing how
conflictual or cooperative the organization views a particular topic or entity.

7

David Kirkpatrick, “Egyptian Party Threatens to Review Treaty with Israel,” New York Times, February 17, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/12/world/middleeast/muslim-brotherhood-threatens-to-review-peace-treaty-withisrael.html?_r=1& (accessed April 10, 2013)
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2. Literature Review
2.1 THE MAKINGS OF A BROTHERHOOD
Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimim, the Muslim Brotherhood, was created in post-colonial Egypt by
Hasan al-Banna in March 1928.8 Al-Banna, a school teacher, originally founded the organization
with six laborers in Isma’ilya, a Suez Canal city. Al-Banna was the leader of several other
Islamic groups. Furthermore, the founding of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood did not
distinguish itself from other similar Islamic groups in Egypt during this time period. Initially, alBanna was concerned with recruiting and retaining a membership base in Isma’iliya during the
organization’s formative years. Discontent with the organization’s growth rate in Isma’iliya, alBanna moved the Brotherhood to Cairo in 1932.9 By subsuming another Islamic organization
which was headed by his brother, al-Banna was able to accomplish a smooth transition and
integrated the former organization’s infrastructure. Within a year, the Brotherhood was
publishing a weekly newsletter, al-Ikhwan.10
Originally the Muslim Brotherhood was strictly an apolitical, religious reformist, and
charitable organization. Al-Banna’s goal for the Brotherhood during this period was to continue
to grow membership while holding private organizational meetings on religious and moral
reform.11 The Brotherhood’s apolitical stance ceased in the latter portion of the 1930s with the
general strike by Arabs in the British Mandate for Palestine. The Brotherhood’s newsletter, alIkhwan, became remarkably more political. The “Palestinian issue” featured prominently in
newsletter themes and issues. More importantly, the general strike would signify the
Brotherhood’s transfer into the religious-political realm. The Brotherhood began financially
8

Munson, “Islamic Mobilization,” 487.
Richard Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brotherhood (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 9.
10 Munson, “Islamic Mobilization,” 490.
11 Eilam, “Egypt: New Government,” 191-193.
9
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supporting the Palestinian cause by fundraising domestically. In addition to their fundraising
efforts, Brotherhood members engaged in demonstrations to garner sympathy and draw attention
to the strike effort. The tone of the Brotherhood’s newsletter also became highly critical of the
current political regime. While Egypt officially established a monarchy and received its
independence from the United Kingdom in 1922, it had hitherto remained under quasi-British
control.12 Thirteen years after its creation, the Muslim Brotherhood solidified its national
political ambitions by announcing a Brotherhood candidate for parliamentary elections in 1941.
According Ziad Munson, the increasingly critical and argumentative tone of the Muslim
Brotherhood’s literature manifested itself in increasingly large Brotherhood-led rallies and
demonstrations which called for the immediate withdrawal of British forces from Egypt.13
Unwilling to acquiesce, British authorities in Egypt responded by ordering the disbandment of
the Brotherhood and the expulsion of al-Banna from Cairo. In October 1941, British authorities
arrested al-Banna and several other Brotherhood leaders. The British, however, were much more
preoccupied with the growing severity of World War II. Shortly after their arrest, the
Brotherhood leaders were released from prison. Immediately after the leadership’s arrests, the
Brotherhood experienced massive membership growth. The organization had more than 400,000
members and two-thousand district offices by 1949.14
In addition to the organization’s massive membership growth after the arrests, the
Brotherhood began increasing the frequency of its rallies and demonstrations, and began several
other publications. Immediately after his arrest al-Banna established the Nizam al-Khas, or the
“secret apparatus,” a clandestine paramilitary arm of the Brotherhood which was responsible for
12
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14 Ibid.
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protecting senior leadership and implementing the organization’s agenda through political
violence. The Nizam al-Khas was also responsible for paramilitary operations. The formation of
the Nizam al-Khas as the military wing of the Brotherhood is extremely important to note
because while the literature that the Brotherhood published during the 1930s was highly critical
of the Egyptian government, hitherto al-Banna had the reputation of being a political moderate.15
Despite this image of moderation, according one of the original members of Nizam al-Khas:
The image [al-Banna] had in his mind since he started his dawa in Isma’iliya about the
[military] aspect of dawa was…of a military group that would encapsulate the idea of
jihad in Islam…He was so keen to emphasize military activity in order to demonstrate the
idea of jihad. But he was frightened that these kinds of things might be used against
him.16
Praegter states that while al-Banna may have always imagined that the conservative Muslim
Brotherhood would manage a military wing, this goal was never part of the original operating
code of the organization.17 Further, she states that the evolution to militancy is evident in the
change of tone in the published literature of the Brotherhood during the 1930s.
This progression to more politically hostile rhetoric and militancy can be directly
attributed to the increasing amount of militant elements within the Brotherhood during the 1930s.
Many Brothers were unhappy with al-Banna’s non-confrontational negotiating style. Al-Banna,
however, realized that the size Brotherhood directly corresponded to its political power, thus he
was extremely hesitant to excommunicate any of the militant factions from the organization.
Instead, al-Banna adopted an appeasement leadership style within the organization while
continuing his non-confrontational negotiating style outside of the organization. However, in
15

Praegter, The Muslim Brotherhood, 27-29.
Ibid., 30.
17 Ibid., 31.
16
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1938 al-Banna officially abandoned his conciliatory style for more militant and provocative
rhetoric, declaring that if the Egyptian government did not acquiesce to the Brotherhood
demands, then the Brotherhood would be “at war with every leader, every party and every
organization that does not work for the victory of Islam!”18 Brotherhood members with a
propensity for violence seized upon this rhetoric.
In a trend which continued until the Arab Spring of 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood was at
the center of popular Egyptian political unrest immediately preceding the culmination of World
War II. Just outside of Cairo in 1947, Egyptian police found a large cache of weapons belonging
to the Brotherhood. In 1948 Egyptian police stopped a vehicle, which belonged to the
Brotherhood, carrying explosives. By the latter portion of the 1940s the Brotherhood had
evolved from an apolitical Islamic organization to the largest opposition force in Egypt—which
was stockpiling weapons. After the seizure of the small-arms and explosives, the Egyptian
government ordered the Brotherhood dissolved. In response, the Brotherhood assassinated
Prime Minister Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi—who was responsible for authoring and issuing the
dissolution order in July 1948.19 Two months later in a surreptitious police stop, al-Banna was
assassinated by Egyptian authorities. After leading the Muslim Brotherhood for two decades, the
death of Hassan al-Banna signified the end of the Brotherhood’s developmental years and the
beginning of a new era.
The Muslim Brotherhood’s political aspirations did not die with Hassan al-Banna. Hassan
al-Hudaybi became the second “Supreme Guide,” or leader, of the organization. Under alHudaybi the Brotherhood became no less critical of the then monarchial Egyptian government,

18
19

Praegter, The Muslim Brotherhood, 27-29.
Munson, “Islamic Mobilization,” 489-491.
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which the Brotherhood viewed as an extension of British colonial power and influence. AlHudaybi strategically aligned the Brotherhood with the Egyptian Free Officers Movement, a
group of young military officers who would eventually stage a coup and overthrow the Egyptian
Monarchy in 1952. The Free Officers were founded and led by Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser.
When leaders of the Free Officers and the new government broke promises to the Brotherhood,
the Brotherhood attempted to assassinate President Nasser in 1954. President Nasser responded
by arresting thousands of Brotherhood members, including its top leadership.20 Moreover,
President Nasser ordered the dissolution of the organization declaring it an illegal institution—it
always remained in existence as an opposition party, although not always a legal institution.
According to Crane, since the 1970s the Muslim Brotherhood has disavowed violence in
its attempt to legitimize itself and participate in Egyptian politics.21 Despite this declaration,
successive Egyptian presidents Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak never fully recognized the
organization. Albeit, both presidents allowed the organization to continue to publish its
newsletters. In 2005, Mubarak allowed Brotherhood candidates to run as independents in the
parliamentary elections. The Brotherhood candidates won 20% of the total parliamentary seats.22
The Muslim Brotherhood’s pledge of nonviolence is perplexing. The Brotherhood has expanded
and spawned branches of the organization throughout the Muslim world. The Brotherhood has
become the ideological father and the financial patron to militant organizations and terrorist
groups, such as: Hamas, Jamaat Islamiya, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and al-Qaeda. The Muslim

20

Munson, “Islamic Mobilization,” 489-491
Mary Crane, “Does the Muslim Brotherhood have ties to Terrorism?,” The Council on Foreign Relations, (April
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22 Sharon Otterman, “Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt’s Parliamentary Elections.” Council on Foreign Relations,
December 1, 2005. Available from http://www.cfr.org/egypt/muslim-brotherhood-egypts-parliamentaryelections/p9319. Accessed on 20 November 2014.
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Brotherhood’s close links to extremist organization and its role as the de jure government in
Egypt requires that its operational code and belief system undergo a close examination.
2.2 THE BROTHERHOOD’S IDEOLOGY
The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is well known for being an extremely conservative
Islamist organization.23 The Muslim Brotherhood’s paradigm is based on the Hanbali School of
Islamic jurisprudence. The Hanbali School is one of the four major schools of thought regarding
Islamic jurisprudence within Sunni Islam—it is also the most conservative in its interpretation of
Sharia law. Adherents to the Hanbali interpretation of Sharia law reference the 1,000 year old
doctrines of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal. Importantly, most Salafists follow the Hanbali school of
thought. The Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists believe that Egypt, and the rest of the Muslim
world, has become polluted by Western ideas and influence.24 As such, the Brotherhood and
Salafist ardently believe that Egyptian society and the Muslim world need religious reform.
Importantly, this leads to the belief in a symbiotic relationship between religious and political
spheres. According to Ghosh and others, the Brotherhood and Salafist feel that the best way to
accomplish this religious reformation is to model public and private life after the piety of the
Prophet and his original followers (Salafi literally translates to “my predecessor”).25
During the early 20th century ridding Egypt of Western and colonial powers was a
primary goal of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood, especially in its formative years,
was often vague when applying their ideology to specific policy issues. Presumably, this
ambiguity was a deliberate strategy to ensure that the Brotherhood did not provoke the Egyptian
government, which, in turn, ensured the longevity of the Brotherhood. The Brotherhood did call
23
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Munson, “Islamic Mobilization,” 488.
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on the government to address social issues, such as, strengthening military and diplomatic
relations with other Arab and Muslim countries, ending usury, improving working conditions,
and reducing unemployment.26 Ultra-conservative elements within the Brotherhood felt that the
Egyptian society had fallen so far away from the “Salafi” Islamic path that government
intervention was needed to implement religious teachings in school, and censor print, radio and
television media.
Aside from Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb (b.1906) was arguably the most influential
Muslim Brotherhood member. Qutb—a novelist, critic, and education administrator by trade—
officially joined the Egyptian Ikhwan 25 years after its founding in 1953.27 While Qutb may
have joined the Brotherhood late in life, his ideological impact on the organization is significant.
Qutb’s writings have been used by various Islamist organizations and terrorist groups for more
than six decades. Qutb is considered by many scholars to be the founding father of modern
radical political Islam, he was not always the fervent religious scholar.28 As a young man Qutb
criticized madrasas that solely taught a religious curriculum. Qutb’s conversion to religiously
motivated and inspired texts can be observed after his sojourn to the United States in the late
1940s. In The America that I Saw, Qutb describes the disgust that he was overwhelmed with
when he was immersed in American culture.29 Qutb had particular disdain for the mingling of
sexes, the sensuality that women consciously exude, and America’s fascination with brutality
and boxing.

26

Praegter, The Muslim Brotherhood, 50.
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29 Ibid., 159-164.
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After returning from the United States, Qutb ideologically aligned himself with the Free
Officers. Subsequently, he was offered and declined the Minister of Education position by
President Nasser. Qutb discovered that despite having utilized the support of the Muslim
Brotherhood during the 1952 revolution, President Nasser had established a secret group,
“Tahreer,” to counter the Brotherhood’s influence in post-monarchist Egypt. He was also among
the Brotherhood leaders who were arrested after the failed assassination attempt of President
Nasser in 1954. Before his arrest, and after, he made a great deal of contribution to the
Brotherhood’s ideology. Shortly after joining the Brotherhood in 1953, he became the editor of
the Brotherhood’s newsletter, al-Ikhwan. Concomitantly, Qutb also became the head of the
Brotherhood’s propaganda wing. Qutb’s greatest contribution to the Brotherhood’s ideology
would come during his time in prison where he wrote his seminal work, Ma’am fi al-Tariq, or as
it is commonly referred to in English, Milestones. In Milestones, Qutb declares that Islam is the
blueprint for a utopian society. He states that Islam is not merely a religion, but a way of life.
Qutb argues that Muslims are duty bound to throw off the confines of Jahiliyyah, the pre-Islamic
ignorance that existed throughout the world before the revelation to the Prophet. Milestones has
been considered “one of the most influential works in Arabic of the last half-century” and is a
call to arms to re-create the world under Quranic law.30
2.3 LITERATURE REVIEW OF OPERATIONAL CODE ANALYSIS
The operational code approach to evaluating the belief systems and rhetoric of a political
entity is a well-established field.31 At its essence operational code analysis seeks to quantify
political-psychological characteristics and evaluate their impact on foreign policy behaviors.

30
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Motivational beliefs are essential to establishing the “who” and “why” of a group’s identity.32
Operational code analysis seeks to identify how this identity is captured in terms of political
belief, which, in turn, leads to political decisions.
Operational code analysis was first formulated by Nathan Leites in 1951 to examine the
political psychology of the Politburo. Leites created a psycho-cultural model to evaluate the
Bolshevik’s operational code.33 He emphasized the role of personality and “cultural milieu” in
the decision making process of the Bolsheviks. These psychological and cultural foundations
create an “operational code.” Leites concluded that the decision making process of the
Bolsheviks was highly influenced by Lenin’s desire for power and fear of annihilation which
stemmed from cultural, environmental, and political factors.
Alexander George expanded and refined Leites’ research on the Bolshevik’s operational
code 16 years later in 1969. Instead of trying to explain the motivational influences, George
systematically arranged the philosophical and instrumental beliefs of the Bolsheviks.34 This new
research argued that philosophical and instrumental beliefs should be considered a composite
belief system which filters incoming information, which, in turn, influences political entities
decision making preference. George created this “heuristic” model by creating ten research
questions (five philosophical and five instrumental) which explain the decision making process
of a subject. Operational code analysis utilizes a bounded rationality model, which assumes an
actor’s rationality during decision making is heavily influenced by the cognitive beliefs, time
constraints, and information available. Researchers who employ operational code analysis have
typically overlooked non-state actors. Recent operational code research has utilized formal
32
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modeling methods and combined it with a game-theory approach to simulate scenarios between
Margaret Thatcher and her key advisors, Ronald Reagan and Gorbachev, and Jimmy Carter and
Anwar Sadat.35 Only recently has research been conducted utilizing operational code analysis
which has evaluated the political psychology and rhetoric of Al-Qaeda and Hamas.36
2.4 PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: WHAT THE LITERATURE SAYS
Public diplomacy is generally accepted as the process in which “international actors seek
to accomplish the goals of their foreign policy by engaging with foreign publics.”37 While the
term public diplomacy is a relatively new term in the realm of international politics, the act itself
is as old as diplomacy and politics. Through its targeted audience, public diplomacy is a form of
political and strategic communication. Traditional public diplomacy has several distinct
elements: listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange, and broadcasting agencies. Each
of these elements can operate independently of the others and attend to its own respective
audiences, and can therefore be researched autonomously.38 Importantly, as a form of
communication, successful public diplomacy hinges on successful dialogue. Accordingly, the
foundation for fruitful and successful public diplomacy is listening. During political
communication and the public diplomacy dialogue, listening refers to the actor’s attempt to
collect and collate data about public opinion in the international environment, and, thereby, form
and redirect its specific and general public diplomacy strategies.39
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Tasking requirements regarding information on foreign public opinion has regularly been
collected as a function of conventional diplomacy and intelligence work. Systematic
assessments of foreign opinion may be a modern invention; however, attempts to understand a
neighboring population’s thought process is as old as there have been spies. Through listening, a
public diplomacy actor is able to more wholly understand the foreign target. This directly leads
to a more complete and substantive understanding of the thought process of the foreign entity
and the issue at hand.40
While listening is the paramount element of the public diplomacy process, the other
elements are also important components to the public diplomacy process. Unlike listening,
however, which was listed first because of its importance, they are listed in no particular order.41
Advocacy refers to an actor’s attempt to influence and manage the international environment
through proactive measures. Elements of advocacy can be seen throughout the other dimensions
of the public diplomacy process because of utility. Advocacy can be seen in action as an element
of the public diplomacy process through the press office of an American embassy or the
informational work produced by various government agencies.42
Cultural diplomacy refers to an actor’s attempt to manipulate and manage the
international environment by publicizing and making its cultural resources and achievements
known overseas. This form of cultural transmission can be seen through cultural institutes, such
as the British Council, the American Schools, or the Italian Cultural Institute. Many cultural
diplomacy organizations find a negative connotation with public and cultural diplomacy, and
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prefer to classify themselves as cultural relations agencies.43 Exchange diplomacy refers to an
actor’s attempt to manage the international environment by sending its own citizens overseas and
reciprocally accepting citizens from overseas for a period time for the purpose of study or
acculturation.44 This type of diplomacy lends to and supports the idea of mutuality and
reciprocity with another country. The seminal example of exchange diplomacy is the Fulbright
Program administered by the US Department of State. The dimensions of advocacy can be used
in conjunction with cultural diplomacy and exchange diplomacy.
Traditionally international news broadcasting (IB) is the attempt by an actor to
manipulate and manage the international environment by leveraging the various technologies of
print, radio, and television.45 Increasingly, IB, as practiced by states, is leveraging the Internet as
a function of public diplomacy. The most powerful element of IB, historically, has been its
ability to manipulate the news. Like advocacy, IB can affect, and is affected by, all the other
dimensions of public diplomacy—particularly, advocacy and information work can augment the
IB dimension. In regards to listening, IB materializes in the monitoring of audience/reader
research functions; with advocacy, IB manifests itself through information work in editorials or
policy broadcasts; with cultural diplomacy, IB appears with the cultural content of various IB
elements and mediums; and with exchange diplomacy, it appears in the programming and
acculturation of participating students and personnel.46 An effective public diplomacy strategy
balances the resources between the various public diplomacy dimensions. To engage the Muslim
Brotherhood in the 21st century the United States will need to have a codified plan which utilizes
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all the elements of public diplomacy while leveraging 21st century technology. This means
dialoguing with the Brotherhood and its audience through various social media platforms.
According to Robert D. Deutsch — a senior associate for International Communications
in the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress—many of the current models of
persuasion utilized by the United States in both the public and private sectors are outdated and
based on theories created from the 1950s.47 Deutsch states that the traditional “push-down”
theories of communication and persuasion—including the infamous “winning hearts and minds”
theory—are obsolete and ineffective in the current global communications environment. He
further argues that people tend to view the world in contradictory and paradoxical terms.
Various populations tend to respond more positively when their identities—rather than their
interests—are understood and appreciated.
With regards to implementing public diplomacy strategies, a detrimental assumption for
the originator of a public diplomacy message is that all audience will be receptive to the foreign
policy message and that they are pragmatic and rational actors. Essentially, the assumption is
that a foreign audience is a mirror image of an American audience and would be a receptive as
an American audience to public diplomacy messages. In actuality, people are highly susceptible
and influenced by symbolic association, images, narratives, metaphors, and mythologies. As
such, rational thought and logic barely influence the decision making process.48 While strategies
from strategic communication and public diplomacy may range from the rudimentary to the
highly complex, modern strategies must include the following implicit messages: 1. I am like
you (something about you is familiar); 2. I like you (I understand you, you can trust me, you can
47
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participate “in” me); and, 3. I am not you, but our difference can help us expand ourselves.49
Effectively expressing, asking and answering these messages is an extremely cathartic
experience for both the sender and receiver of the public diplomacy message. All of the
messages mentioned above center around creating the impression of a shared experience. The
creation of this shared experience directly leads to a relationship building experience between the
two entities to construct a more effective public diplomacy strategy.
In the new digital environment, globalization and the Information Age have redefined the
modes and means of communication. New communication and information technologies have
amplified, accentuated, and accelerated the global interconnectedness between countries,
corporations, and organizations.50 There have been two major events in the last two decades that
greatly shaped the nature of 21st century public diplomacy: the culmination of the Cold War and
the September 11th terror attacks.51 In the wake of collapse of the Soviet Union, the United
States became the lone global superpower. The lack of a tangible and readily identifiable
adversary led American decision and policymakers to consolidate and reprioritize funding; the
United States Information Agency (USIA), which was the main government apparatus for public
diplomacy during the Cold War, merged with the US Department of State in 1999.52 Also, the
behemoth in United States public diplomacy, the International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB)
subsumed Voice of America (VOA), the public diplomacy medium which arguably greatly
contributed to winning the “hearts and minds” of foreign public across the globe. Naturally,
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because of the lack of attention and funding, public diplomacy was underutilized during the latter
portion of the 1990s.53
According to Xin Zhong and Jiayi Lu, after the September 11th terror attacks the
question, “Why do they hate us?” arose as a mantra.54 At the time, the United States was using
its full range of diplomatic, information, military, and economic capabilities. Various public
diplomacy measures and strategies arose during this period. Most notably, the George W. Bush
administration spearheaded the “Shared Values Campaign” in 2001 and the “Middle East
Listening Tour” in 2005. Both of these public diplomacy projects targeted the Muslim world and
sought to repair the U.S. image in the Middle East. The ultimate aim of these public diplomacy
projects was to mold foreign popular opinion, defend American positions and rebut any
misinformation. During the beginning of the Iraq war, for example, American diplomats were
forced to refute and rebut erroneous Turkish press reports about vast number of rapes of Iraqi
women by American servicemen.55 While the various diplomatic delegations for the respective
public diplomacy programs traveled throughout the world, particularly the Middle East, they
were widely criticized for not engaging the public enough in controversial issues.
In 2008, U.S. Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy James Glassman coined the
term “Public Diplomacy 2.0.” This moniker, typically found in the high-tech industry, was a
clear indication of a wider policy shift within the Department of State signifying the future use of
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new information technologies during public diplomacy engagements.56 Specifically, it signified
the future and expanded use of social media technologies when engaging in public diplomacy.
In a globalized world, interconnectedness and interdependence have become a common theme
on which social networking has the capacity to capitalize on. The defining aspect of social media
is its interconnectivity between users and its ability to transform the public diplomacy arena into
an individual and proactive experience for all participants.
The ability of internet users to easily comment and thereby post feedback on various
issues on the internet has been described as “Web 2.0.” In regards to Public Diplomacy 2.0, the
internet has transformed into a medium allowing various actors to engage in actual dialogue on
various issues. Recognizing this, the Department of State has created the Digital Outreach Team
(DOT), which is a part of the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications. The stated
mission of the DOT is to “counter terrorist propaganda and misinformation about the United
States across a wide variety of interactive digital environments that had previously been ceded to
extremists.”57 The DOT is a small group of ten civil servants who only cover the Middle East
region. Six of the members monitor and post on Arabic websites; while the other four members
are divided amongst Farsi and Urdu websites.58 The DOT members do not comment on benign
message boards or topics, but reserve their efforts for contentious topics. The aim of the DOT is
not necessarily to change the opinions of foreign publics; it is, instead, to counter misinformation
and expose Web 2.0 users to the United States’ viewpoint.
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One stipulation that the DOT must abide by, however, is that all posts from its members
must be attributed to the DOT and the Department of State. It is not uncommon for DOT
members to list their full names in message board postings. This fits the team’s agenda as an
“outreach” team as opposed to an indoctrination team. Interestingly, some scholars disagree
with this approach to transparent authorship. Mark Leonard and Evgeny Morozov both argue
that governments should remain covert and silent about their activities to ensure message
credibility.59 While this argument is debatable, the choice for authorship transparency by the
DOT was a “strategic choice to maintain credibility.”60
In the twenty-first century, internet users have access to seemingly infinite amounts of
information.

Access to potential foreign publics is not a pertinent issue for public diplomacy

strategies in the twenty-first century. Instead, with so much information available via the
internet the issue of establishing and maintaining relevance is far more critical.61 The absolute
worst thing to potentially befall a public diplomacy strategy is for it to become irrelevant. The
proper leveraging of social media as a public diplomacy tool can be a difficult and precarious
endeavor. Successfully leveraging social media as a public diplomacy tool requires much skill;
if not done correctly, social media usage for public diplomacy will drift into the internet ether—
where it will quickly be overlooked and forgotten. This can be seen by, presumably, junior
public diplomacy officers with the Department of State unfamiliar with social media not using
hashtags when tweeting about particular events.62 While seemingly a simple oversight, using
hashtags in various social media platforms allows users to target trending topics and interested
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individuals. To maintain relevancy and exposure it is important to employ an effective strategy
and processes when using social media as public diplomacy tool.
Recent research suggests that the best means of using social media as a public diplomacy
tool is to consider social media as a Strategic Issue Management (SIM) process which allows
“being vigilant for throats and opportunities that can affect how the organization achieved its
mission and vision.”63 This process enables public diplomacy users to view the fluid structure of
social media in a methodical and logical manner. This method also allows public diplomacy
users to codify various aspects of social media, thereby creating a solidified strategy process for
their respective public diplomacy message. The SIM process is broken up into four distinct
components: issue fermenting and going viral; the proactive phase; the reactive phase; and the
issue receding and new issue emerging.64
In stage one, the “issue fermenting phase,” a particular political or social issue goes
“viral” on the internet. There are usually signs of a potential issue emerging and triggering
event.65 This stage is characterized by increased social media mentions on blogs, microblogs,
etc. After the issue goes viral on the internet, depending on the size and scope of the issue,
traditional media will join in. It is at this point that a public diplomacy outreach team must
decide to act or not. It is in the next two stages where treating social media as a SIM process
becomes a strategic tool for public diplomacy. If a public diplomacy outreach team decides to
act then the SIM process moves to the second stage. In the second stage, the “proactive phase,”
research is conducted on the issue, the concerned parties, and the targeted audience. During the
proactive phase the public diplomacy outreach team leverages social media to reinforce a certain
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message or agenda.66 This can be done through a myriad of ways, including: staging events with
certain political actors, countering disinformation or emphasizing certain issues with various
forms of media. The most important portion of this stage is for the public diplomacy outreach
team to “reinforce favorable viral trends.” In the third stage, the “reactive phase,” is
characterized by conflict emerging with the distributed public diplomacy message. In this stage
the most important role of the public diplomacy outreach team is to respond to negative
messages and counter misinformation propagated by opponents. In the final stage, the initial
issue recedes from the viral phase. However, simply because the issues has receded does not
mean that the public diplomacy outreach team forgets about the issue. If the issue is important
enough in size and scope, the public diplomacy outreach team will and should establish long
term and strategic relationships with key actors regarding the issue. Additionally, while the issue
is receding the public diplomacy team is monitoring emerging trends for a new issue.67
As can be seen from the SIM process, it is a large feedback loop. As one issue recedes,
another issue should, or will, emerge. In addition to being a large feedback loop, there can be
various feedback loops throughout various stages of the SIM process. For example, during the
proactive phase, the public diplomacy outreach team’s actions could spark a new issue which
goes viral; thereby sending the SIM process back to stage one of the process. Table 1 illustrates
the circularity of the SIM process.
Table 1 – The Strategic Issue Management Process 68
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Recent cases studies show that the SIM process can be an effective strategy for utilizing
social media tool for public diplomacy.69 These case studies focus on the roll which microblogs
(i.e. Twitter and Weibo) could play in public diplomacy strategies. The SIM process gives public
diplomacy outreach teams a methodology to utilize social media. Recently the SIM process was
used to analyze the newly appointed U.S. Ambassador to China’s arrival in Beijing. The
research evaluated social media mentions of a visit to Starbucks the ambassador made when he
first arrived in China.70 As this methodology was applied to China and its social media
programs, so it too can be applied to Egypt in regards to the Muslim Brotherhood.
This literature review shows that there are gaps within the academic literature concerning
the Muslim Brotherhood and its operational code, and between the Muslim Brotherhood and
public diplomacy. Conventionally operational code analysis has been conducted only on state-
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level actors, which has left organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood critically under examined.
Public diplomacy has been woefully neglected and underutilized in twenty-first century and
during the period of War on Terror. Correspondingly, there is little research on public
diplomacy and its use alongside fundamentalist organizations—specifically the Muslim
Brotherhood. Finally, the relatively new idea of applying the SIM process to public diplomacy
has only been applied to issues which are arguably immaterial and irrelevant.
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3. Research Design and Methodology
3.1 RESEARCH DESIGN
This research proposes to evaluate the political rhetoric and psychology of the Muslim
Brotherhood through operational code analysis. To address the research question of how has the
political rhetoric of the Muslim Brotherhood evolved over the last decade, three distinct periods
of the modern Muslim Brotherhood history are examined: 1. The Parliament Era (2005-2011); 2.
The De Jure Era (2011-2013); and 3. Operation Protective Edge (July 2014 to September 2014).
Within the first two periods three crucially important issues which transcend the temporal scope
of each period will be evaluated, these are: 1. the Brotherhood’s view on the Israeli-Palestinian
Issue; 2. the Brotherhood’s view of the United States and Americans; and, 3. the Brotherhood’s
view of the security establishment in Egypt. The last period, which is represented by Operation
Protective Edge, will only evaluate the role of Israel since this time period evaluates an issue
where Israel was a primary belligerent. Each issue was chosen for a specific reason. The
Brotherhood originally began as a pro-Palestinian movement, therefore, the Brotherhood’s
current view on the Israel will be evaluated. Since the Brotherhood is the largest opposition
party in Egypt its views on the Egyptian government and military will also be evaluated. For
potential; public diplomacy strategies the Brotherhood’s view on the United States will also be
evaluated. Operation Protective Edge was chosen as the final temporal variable since it
represents a timely issue concerning the entities being evaluated for this thesis. Additionally, it
also represents a well-timed and relevant geo-political issue to evaluate the role of public
diplomacy and the strategic issue management process with respect to the Muslim Brotherhood.
Documents authored by the Brotherhood concerning each issue from each time period
will be analyzed using Profiler Plus – an operational code analysis software. Evaluating the
27

political rhetoric from each era will allow for the assessment of the evolution of the
Brotherhood’s operational code, if any. The operational code analysis approach offers a distinct
advantage, both theoretically and methodically, for examining the ideological and belief systems
of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. This approach can be applied systematically to an
organization since motivational beliefs appear at the structural, group, and individual levels.71
To quantify the political rhetoric of the Muslim Brotherhood, this research will use the
modern Verbs In Context System (VICS) coding system which was originally set forth by
George, and further codified by Schaefer and Walker.72 The premise for the VICS system is that
an individual’s cognitive beliefs can be discerned from the way that individual speaks “about
power systems in the political universe.”73 VICS is a logical, yet subjective classification
system. By monitoring the cooperative and conflictual utterances, coding the direction, scaling
the intensity of transitive verbs within the Muslim Brotherhood’s rhetoric and then indexing the
results, a broad picture emerges of how the Muslim Brotherhood views the political universe and
the use power within it.
Coding using VICS has traditionally been done by hand. However, Social Science
Automation, Inc. has created a program, Profiler Plus, which is specifically designed for VICS
coding and operational code analysis. Profiler Plus was distinctively designed to conduct at-adistance psychological assessments, including leadership trait analysis, operational code analysis,
etc. Profiler Plus is a restricted open-source program which is continually updated. The
software is available free of charge to academics conducting unfunded research at the graduate
level. Profiler Plus can be utilized in a variety of languages, including English and Arabic.
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However, since the researcher only has rudimentary Arabic language skills, this research will
rely on English versions of Brotherhood documents. Furthermore, it has been determined that it
would be too cumbersome and financially intensive to rely on an exclusive translator and/or
translation service for this research. Since most speeches and literature is available in digital
format, Profiler Plus will be used for coding purposes. The Profiler Plus software is “entirely
rule-based” providing fine grained control and complete process transparency.74 The raw
quantitative data is then imported into a data analysis program such as Microsoft Excel or SPSS
for interpretation, assessment and analysis by the researcher. Using Profiler Plus will allow for
the examination of more documents than the slower method of manually coding each document.
Traditional operational code analysis evaluated only the verbal rhetoric of actors, such as
speeches or impromptu interviews; printed sources, however, are no less valuable. Additionally,
and importantly, formats for communicating during the globalization era have expanded greatly.
Since the internet has become a primary node of communications, this research will primarily
evaluate digital communications published by the Muslim Brotherhood.
Listed below are the specific philosophical and instrumental beliefs which operational
code analysis evaluates. The philosophical indices refer to an entity’s beliefs regarding the
essence of political life and the entity views on other actors within the political universe. When
indexed, instrumental beliefs provide information on an entity’s internal attributions regarding
his or her methodology and approach to political action.75 Each respective belief is referred to
by its number, for example P-1, P-2, and P-3.
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Philosophical Beliefs in an Operational Code
P-1 – What is the “essential” nature of political life?
P-2 – What are the prospects for the eventual realization if one’s fundamental
aspirations?
P-3 – Is the political future predictable?
P-4 – How much “control” or “master” can one have over historical development?
P-5 – What is the role of “chance” in the human affairs and in historical development?
Instrumental Beliefs in an Operational Code
I-1 – What is the best approach for selecting goal or objectives for political action?
I-2 – How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?
I-3 – How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled and accepted?
I-4 – What is the best “timing” of action to advance one’s interests?
I-5 – What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one’s interests?
Schafer and Walker consider and conceptualize the first Philosophical and Instrumental
beliefs (P-1 and I-1) as the “master beliefs.” Based upon the theories of “cognitive consistency,”
the other beliefs within each category (Philosophical and Instrumental) should “flow from and be
theoretically and empirically linked to the master beliefs.”76 This research will not analyze all of
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the philosophical and instrumental belief indices. Firstly, the thesis’ aim is to provide
researchers with a broad framework of the Muslim Brotherhood’s operational code. Secondly,
not all of the philosophical and instrumental indices are relevant because the issues transcend
several decades and cover different subtopics within each issue. The philosophical and
instrumental beliefs to be analyzed are: P-1, P-2, I-1, and I-2. The process for determining the
quantitative score for each respective philosophical and instrumental beliefs and a more
expanded definition is listed below.
P-1: The Nature of the Political Universe: Friendly, Mixed, Hostile
This index is computed by a “ratio of the frequency of positive to negative utterance the
leader makes when talking about other in the political universe. The index varies
between –1 to +1 with low scores, indicating, on average, the [entity] see others as more
hostile in the political universe while high score indicates that the [entity] see other as
more friendly. The specific formula [for this index] is the percentage of positive
utterances about others minus the percentage of negative utterance about others.”77 The
score of this index is based upon the assumption that a political entity’s view of another
corresponds to the political entity’s view on politics, political nature, and the general
view of the other.

P-2: Prospects for Realizing Fundamental Values: Optimism versus Pessimism
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This is index is computed by “weighting each verb according to the intensity value of its
coding category (-3 to + 3) and divide the result by the total number of coded verbs. This
index varies from –1 at the pessimistic end of the continuum to +1 at the optimistic end.
The formula for P-2 index is the mean intensity of utterances about others divided by
three.”78 By weighting this index, the intensity with which a political entity views
another’s actions can be evaluated. While in P-1 a researcher can deduce whether or not
a political entity views the political universe as “good or evil,” the P-2 index evaluates
the intensity of that belief; and thereby the optimism or pessimism of the political entity.
I-1: Direction of Strategy: Cooperative, Mixed, Conflictual
The formula for this index is the “percentage of cooperative (+) utterances made when
talking about self minus the percentage of Conflictual (--) utterances regarding about
self.”79 This index ranges from –1 to +1. Lower scores suggest that the political entity
finds more utility in conflictual actions; whereas higher scores indicates a tendency for
more cooperative strategy. This index directly corresponds to P-1. This index evaluates
political entity’s general conflictual and cooperative tendencies by aggregating all
utterance about “self.” The theory is the more utterance about “self” and conflictual
action, the more conflictual the political entity is going to define its potential strategy,
and vice versa.
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I-2: Intensity of Tactics
The specific formula for this index is the “mean intensity of utterances made when
talking about self divided by three.”80 As with the other indexes listed, this index ranges
from –1 to +1. Lower scores indicate the entity’s belief about the utility of hostile action,
and, conversely, higher scores suggest the entity’s belief in the utility of cooperative
action. As I-1 is concerned with the direction of the of apolitical entity’s strategy
concerning others, I-2 is focused on the intensity to which the political entity will pursue
those tactics. Similar to P-2, the I-2 index does this by weighting the number of
utterances about self.
During the coding process, the Profiler Plus program evaluates each sentence from a
document and evaluates the verbs within each sentence using VICS. Then the program generates
a numerical value concerning the conflictual and cooperative tendencies. However, since
sentences can be complex and “run-ons,” more often than not, a single sentence could have
several verbs. Next the sentence is analyzed several times by Profiler Plus with different values
for each evaluated verb. Depending on the language and style of a particular document, the
document could have several direct or indirect objects. Also, confusingly, sometimes the object
of the sentence is not specifically stated but implied. This requires the author to read every
evaluated line from Profiler Plus to determine who was the object or indirect object of each verb.
It is important to note that the VICS coding results are not definitively indicative of a
specific decision making process. Depending on how the research is designed, operational code
analysis evaluates a particular issue, speech, etc. As such, holistic generalizations about a
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political actor’s operational code cannot be proclaimed utilizing only operational code analysis.
A comparative analysis, however, can be conducted across issue based and temporal variables
using operational code results from a particular issue or time period as a reference point.
Thenceforth, a change in conflictual and cooperative tendencies can be compared to the initial
reference sample.
The assumption within operational code theory is that the answers to the aforementioned
questions will provide constraints during the actor’s decision making process. This leads to a
unique bounded rationality for the actor and his/her respective organization. From this a
distinctive decision making process materializes which can be quantified and evaluated. The
Profiler Plus software analyzes each document by coding each verb utterance and then
separating them into “self” and “other” categories. Profiler Plus then assigns a verb category
indices/score to the verbs ranging from +3 to -3. An operational code can then be calculated
from either a single document or a series of aggregated documents—Profiler Plus has the
capability to analyze a single document or a series of aggregated documents.
This project will utilize “at-a-distance” methodology. To evaluate the political
psychology and operational code characteristics of the Muslim Brotherhood from a distance
without having direct access to the organization’s leaders. The key assumption to this
methodology is that inferences can be made about the belief system of the Brotherhood by
examining published literature and the verbal behavior of subjects through speeches without
having direct access to the leadership.
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3.2 DATA TO BE COLLECTED
Since this research project will evaluate the political rhetoric of the Muslim Brotherhood,
the data for this project will be official publications of the Brotherhood (i.e. position papers,
newsletters, pamphlets, etc.). Additionally, there is a requirement of 500 words for each
document being evaluated. This will ensure that there are enough verbs to be coded in each
document to make it statistically significant. The data for the research project will be taken from
a variety of sources. As the author has only minimal Arabic language study, the vast majority of
the data will be from secondary sources—the material is already translated and transcribed. The
Muslim Brotherhood’s websites will be major sources of information.81
Despite using both Muslim Brotherhood websites, the English website will serve as the
primary source for data collection for several reasons. Firstly, the Brotherhood’s English
language is headquartered in London and written solely in English.82 This will facilitate the
coding process because the English text is easily accessible and imported in ProfilerPlus. While
open source translation tools and software are available, they do not substitute for the expertise
of a native speaker.83 As such, subtleties in the message could be lost when utilizing software
such as Google Translate. Despite offering an Arabic language version of the program, the
researcher would still have needed to utilize translation services.84 While ProfilerPlus will code

81

The Muslim Brotherhood maintains an Arabic website at www.ikhwanonline.com and an English website at
www.ikhwanweb.com.
82 For more information of the Muslim Brotherhood’s see the About Us page at:
http://www.ikhwanweb.com/about.php. Accessed 27 November 2014.
83 E.M. Balk, M. Chung, N. Hadar. “Accuracy of Data Extraction of Non-English Language Trials with Google
Translate [Internet].” National Center for Biotechnology Information. Available from:
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov.
84 The researcher explored the option of utilizing a native Arabic translator. However, the nature of this research
changed, and new documents were added and detracted to the research quite regularly. It would be unreasonable to
enlist the help, or spend funds to hire a translator.

35

the intensity of verbs and identify the object that it pertains to, it is the onus of the researcher to
make the final determination of the object that the verb is referring to.
The last section that will evaluate the Muslim Brotherhood’s political rhetoric will do so
by gathering texts from the Brotherhood’s English website. Additionally, utilizing the ideas of
Public Diplomacy 2.0, rhetoric from the Muslim Brotherhood’s social media sites (e.g. Facebook
and Twitter). Since typical social media posts fall well below the 500 word threshold, the posts
will not be run through ProfilerPlus, but will be assessed cursorily by hand. As such, the
philosophical and instrumental indices will not be quantified. Instead, the frequency of posts and
references to Operation Protective Edge will be measured for the social media posts.
3.3 CAVEATS
There are several potential issues that could arise during the course of this operational
analysis model. Since the methodology for this research will use operational code analysis “at a
distance” there could be legitimate questions about the validity of the primary and secondary
data collected. The first issue of concern is the true authorship of Muslim Brotherhood speeches
and literature. Often speeches and official pieces of literature are products of the key members
within an administration or organization. Thus if the speechwriter, or speechwriters, truly wrote
a speech which is being analyzed, is the analysis not capturing the speechwriter or speechwriters’
operational code? If this research was concerned with the unconscious psychology and
characteristics of a specific leader within the Muslim Brotherhood, then this certainly would be a
legitimate concern. But this research is concerned with the overt characteristics and operational
code of the entire Muslim brotherhood; therefore, this issue is not of great concern since the
beliefs of Brotherhood leaders applies structurally to the organization.
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A second concern for this research is whether to focus analysis on the rhetoric of the
leader of the Muslim Brotherhood or key advisors within the organization. Again, if this
research were focused on the unconscious characteristics and psychology of a specific leader this
issue would be of great concern. Historically various leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood often
had differing or contradictory views from prominent brotherhood members who helped shape the
Brotherhood’s ideology. Since the organizational and structural beliefs of the Brotherhood are
the most important factors for this research, published opinion editorials and position pieces by
the Brotherhood will be selected. This will ensure that the documents can be applied holistically
to the organizational culture.
The final issue is the matter of deception. What if the official rhetoric of the Muslim
Brotherhood is intentionally deceptive? According to Schaefer and Walker, it is extremely
difficult to engage in deceptive rhetoric techniques for an entire speech or piece of literature.85
True deceit is difficult because the VICS coding system evaluates verbs within a speech or piece
of literature the small amount of deceptive verbs will prove statistically insignificant by the
utterance of verbs which are actually indicative of the true operational code. This assumes that
the entire piece of work is not intended to be a source of deceit.
3.4 FINAL THOUGHTS
The Muslim Brotherhood is a complex political entity. As the largest political opposition
group in Egypt and their decision-making process and capacity for violence makes the
organization a legitimate entity for academic research.86 Albeit the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt
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is not a state entity, and the difference between state entities and the Muslim Brotherhood are
quite stark, the Muslim Brotherhood is certainly an actor within the political universe in Egypt
and the greater Middle East.87 Importantly, there is previous research regarding operational code
analysis and its application to secondary and tertiary actors within the political universe.
Therefore, it is apt to apply this research method to Muslim Brotherhood political rhetoric.
Not dissimilar to Picucci’s research, this thesis will perform a cursory study of the Muslim
Brotherhood’s operational code with the ultimate intention of contributing to the field of study of
strategic communication and operational code analysis. The rationale behind this examination
and methodology is multidimensional.88 The decision-making process of the Muslim
Brotherhood can be evaluated utilizing the same kinds of analytical and theoretical techniques
that other primary and state actors within the political universe are evaluated. Specifically,
political and psychological theories can be applied to examine the organization. The decision
making process of the Muslim Brotherhood is susceptible to influence from internal and external
beliefs. The history, position and influence that the Muslim Brotherhood within Egypt, the
Middle East, and the international community has created a “collective identity” and “communal
beliefs.”89 By viewing the Muslim Brotherhood as a genuine actor within the political universe,
its belief system can by evaluated utilizing operational code analysis. Analyzing the operational
code of the Muslim Brotherhood across temporal and issue-based variables can provide
extremely valuable insight into the behavior of the organization.
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As valuable as operational code analysis can be in revealing the motivations and
intricacies behind the decision making process for political actors, there are a myriad of other
intra and external influences that affect the decision making process of any political entity. 90
This research is not meant to serve as a definitive piece on the decision making process of the
Muslim Brotherhood, but is intended to glean information on the organization’s operational code
over the last decade. Further, absent absolute and extreme values, classifying the Muslim
brotherhood’s decision-making process as inherently conflictual or cooperative would be
impossible. It can be said, however, that particular actor’s belief system is comparatively more
conflictual or more cooperative than a reference point or benchmark. As such, the De Jure era
and Operation Protective Edge will be compared to the Parliament Era, which will serve as the
benchmark era.
One issue expected to arise during the evaluation process of the Muslim Brotherhood’s
operational code is the issue of the divine. Picucci encountered a similar issue in his dissertation
Terrorism’s Operational Code.91 The issue is determining whether to count the divine (i.e. God
or Allah) as inside or outside of the Muslim Brotherhood’s “in-group”. Specifically, for coding
purposes, to consider divine references as “self” or “others”. In his research, Picucci codes
references of the divine as “others.” He argues that while God, or Allah, is a legitimate actor
within the political universe of Islam, it is not, however, a member of the “in-group.” While
Hamas and al-Qaeda may see themselves as actors implementing the will of God, or Allah, there
exists a clear delineation between the “in-group” and Allah. Expressions such as “If Allah wills
it” lend credence to this assumption.92 However, references to the divine for this research will be

90

Picucci, Terrorism’s Operational Code, 2-3.
Ibid, 167.
92 Ibid, 167.
91

39

viewed differently. For this research references of the divine are classified as part of the “ingroup”—specifically, for coding purposes as “self.” Picucci’s research, using a variety of
documents and concerning several topics, compared the political rhetoric between Hamas and alQaeda. This research, however, compares the Muslim Brotherhood’s operational code between
three different topics within the confines of a single organization. More importantly, within each
of the three different topics being evaluated, there is a clear “other.” Within the Establishment
topic, the “other” is the Mubarak regime and the Egyptian security establishment. With regard to
the Israel and United States topics, Israel and the United States are classified as “others.”
The clear distinction between “self” and “others” in this research creates an interesting
dynamic that did not exist in Picucci’s research. This research views the divine as an extension
of the “self.” For this particular research classifying divine references as “other” would be
tantamount to referencing them with equal intensity as references to the main subjects being
evaluated by this research. Clearly the Muslim Brotherhood has much different views between
the divine and such topics as the Mubarak regime, Israel and the United States. While Picucci
considered his subjects as actors implementing the will of God, for this research the divine is
viewed as having a symbiotic relationship with Muslim Brotherhood.93 As such, for the purpose
of this research, the divine is considered an extension of the Muslim Brotherhood; and any
utterances about the divine should, therefore, be classified as “self” during the coding process.
Another issue expected to arise during analysis is divine references which are inherently
conflictual. Even without processing the data through Profiler Plus, it is clear that the Qur’anic
verses and the utterances about the divine appeared more conflictual than the rest of the rhetoric
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within the texts. Again, Picucci encountered a similar issue within his research.94 The texts
relating to the divine appeared to be the most conflictual of all the texts. This research and
Picucci’s research differ in the sense of attribution of divine references. Since Picucci coded
references of the divine as “other,” the philosophical indices were coded more towards the
conflictual end of the spectrum. Conversely, since this research will code divine references as
part of the “in-group,” it is the instrumental indices which will be affected.
A final matter is the issue of the word count for documents. Many of the documents that
were available on Ikhwanweb.com fell below the minimum word count established as the
statistically significant threshold. As such, to ensure that effective and statistically relevant
analysis could be run utilizing VICS, the smaller bodies of texts were aggregated together into a
single unit.95 Methodologically, only text from the same topic would be aggregated together.
Since the topics being evaluated (e.g. the Establishment, Israel, and the United States) are
inherently broad, there are several sub-topics within each topic. To ensure the most relevant
VICS coding possible, it was decided to combine texts with similar sub-topics.96 Finally the
scores from these texts were combined with the scores from the other analyses.
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4. Results and Discussion
4.1 PERIOD ONE: THE PARLIAMENT ERA
The operational code values during the Parliament Era ranged from moderately
conflictual to moderately cooperative. For the Parliament Era, a total of 12 Muslim Brotherhood
documents – all obtained from Ikhawanweb.com – were analyzed using ProfilerPlus. Five
documents were evaluated regarding the “Establishment” topic. Regarding “Israel” four
documents were analyzed. And, finally, three documents were evaluated concerning the “United
States”. Individually, each document analyzed met the minimum 500 word count needed to be
considered valid for ProfilerPlus analysis. Table 2 lists the specific values for the philosophical
and instrumental beliefs evaluated for the Muslim Brotherhood.
Table 2 – The Parliament Era’s Operational Code
Period Two: The Parliament Era

The Establishment

t

Israel

t

The United States

t

P-1

-0.209

-1.56

-0.375

-.1.91

0.037

.812

P-2

-0.235

-2.02

-0.375

.513

-0.111

.841

I-1

0.153

.443

0.333

1.24

0.846

.945

I-2

0.087

-.678

0.144

.789

0.410

-.874

n= 12
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4.1.1 The Establishment
For the Establishment topic the P-1 index was moderately conflictual with a value of
-0.209. This index is arguably the all-encompassing index, as it takes into account the evaluated
political entity’s view on politics, political nature, and general view of others. This index gives
researchers an indication on how the Muslim Brotherhood views the political universe. The
numerical values for the P-1 index during this period illustrate the Brotherhood perceiving the
political universe in more hostile terms. During the Parliament Era the P-2 index had a
numerical value of -0.235. This index indicates the Brotherhood viewed the political universe
and the actions of the security establishment in Egypt in moderately pessimistic terms.
Unlike the philosophical indices measured for this period, the instrumental indices had
slightly positive values within the measurable spectrum. The I-1index for this period had a value
of 0.153. Absent extreme values, the value for this index indicates a mixed view on the
organization’s strategy to be taken with the security establishment. As such, the Muslim
Brotherhood’s strategy with respect to the security establishment cannot be definitively classified
as cooperative or conflictual. The I-2 index had a similar value near the middle of the
measurable spectrum with a value of 0.087. This index measures the intensity of the belief in the
utility of conflictual or cooperative strategy. The score near the middle of the spectrum for this
index indicates a mixed view on the utility of cooperative and conflictual action.
4.1.2 Israel
The P-1 index regarding Israel for the Parliament Era had a value of -0.375. The value
for this index had the lowest score for the philosophical indices for this period compared to all
three topics. The value for this index implies that Muslim Brotherhood viewed the political
universe and its relation to Israel more adversely than compared to the security establishment or
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the United States. The P-2 index regarding Israel also had a numerical value of -0.375. The
Muslim Brotherhood’s prospects for realizing their fundamental values involving Israel are
moderately pessimistic in this era. The negative P-1 score suggests that the Brotherhood
anticipated that Israel’s political objectives were mostly conflictual during the period. Equal to
this anticipation is the Brotherhood’s belief that Israel would pursue those ends with hostile
action which is indicated by the moderately negative P-2 score. The documents concerning
Israel during this period concerned the Muslim Brotherhood’s moral obligation to protect the
citizens of Gaza. Israel and her actions are specifically referenced by the Muslim Brotherhood in
this period’s documents which explains the sharp decrease in both the philosophical and
instrumental indices for this period.
Interestingly, while the Muslim Brotherhood had moderately conflictual philosophical
scores the organization simultaneously had moderately cooperative instrumental scores with
respect to Israel during this period. The I-1 index for this period had a value of 0.333. This
index score still lies within the cooperative end of spectrum regarding the Brotherhood’s strategy
with respect to Israel. The I-2 index had a value of 0.144. While not as cooperative as the score
from the I-1 index, the I-2 index indicates a mixed view on the utility between cooperative
antagonistic actions. With regard to the Muslim Brotherhood’s decision making process
concerning issues with Israel (as manifested through the instrumental beliefs), the scores for
Israel fell in between the scores for the security establishment and the United States. This
signifies that during the Parliament Era the Muslim Brotherhood had a more cooperative strategy
regarding issues related to Israel than compared to issues regarding the Egyptian government and
military. However, the instrumental scores were not as cooperative as those observed for the
United States.
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4.1.3 The United States
For this time period the Muslim Brotherhood had the most cooperative tendencies
towards the United States with respect to both the philosophical and instrumental belief indices.
The P-1 index with respect to the United States had the only positive score with a slightly
cooperative value of 0.037. The I-1 index had a highly cooperative value of 0.846. The P-1
index indicates that the Muslim Brotherhood had a mixed-view view of the nature of the political
universe with respect to the United States. Compared to the P-1 indices with respect to the
security establishment and Israel, however, the Brotherhood had the most cooperative tendencies
towards the United States. Interestingly, the I-1 index, and the direction of the Brotherhood’s
strategy, during this era was the most extreme of the indices and eras observed. The score of
0.846 indicates that the Brotherhood’s strategy was highly cooperative with respect to current
and prospective engagement with the United States.
The corresponding philosophical and instrumental indices (P-2 and I-2) were also the
least conflictual—and thereby the most cooperative indices for this period. The P-2 index had a
value of -0.111. The P-1 index signifies that the Muslim Brotherhood viewed the actions of the
United States in mixed terms between friendly and hostile. Relatively, the Brotherhood viewed
the actions of the United States in less hostile terms compared to the actions of Israel and the
security establishment during the Parliament Era. The I-2 index had a value 0.410. This I-2
index was also the highest value of all the eras observed, and indicated that, compared to the
other eras and topics, the Brotherhood viewed more utility in cooperative action with the United
States during the Parliament era.
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4.1.4 Final Thoughts
Relatively, the philosophical index scores during this period for the security
establishment and Israel were moderately conflictual. This indicates that the Muslim
Brotherhood viewed the political universe with respect to those two variables and the actions of
those entities in hostile terms. The P-1 index with respect to the United States had the only
positive score and, thereby, the Brotherhood’s most cooperative philosophical score. With
regard to strategy and instrumental beliefs, the organization had the least cooperative strategy
(I-1) and viewed more utility in a mixed conflictual and cooperative strategy (I-2) with the
security establishment and Israel. The Brotherhood’s most cooperative strategy was reserved for
the United States which had the highest scores with respect instrumental beliefs scores during
this period.
The most conflictual philosophical scores for this period were reserved for Israel.
Cursorily this can be explained by the type of texts that were analyzed with respect to Israel.
The majority of the texts analyzed were inherently conflictual with respect to Israel and were
often concerned Israeli advancements into the occupied territories. References to Israel by the
Brotherhood were never direct; Israel was often referred to as the Zionists. Similarly, with
respect to the establishment the texts often referred to specific grievances that the Brotherhood
had with the government (i.e. political prisoners). With respect to the United States, several of
the text referred to President Obama and the changing executive branch administration. This
could partially explain the relatively cooperative scores that the United States received. The
changing administration could have been viewed by the Muslim Brotherhood as an opportunity
to engage with the United States. However, to definitively determine this more research would
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need to be conducted on the organization’s operational code during the previous administration
would need to be conducted.
4.2 PERIOD THREE: THE DE JURE ERA
In this Period only the United States had positive scores for the philosophical indices.
Further, this era solidified the Muslim Brotherhood’s conflictual beliefs about the political realm
with respect to the security establishment and Israel. Interestingly, the scores for the
instrumental indices across the observed topics were varied from moderately conflictual to
moderately cooperative. For this era seven documents were evaluated regarding the
“Establishment” topic. Regarding “Israel” three documents were analyzed. And, finally, three
documents were evaluated concerning the “United States”. Table 3 lists the operational code
results for this era.
Table 3 – The De Jure Era’s Operational Code
Period Three: The De Jure Era
The Establishment t

Israel

t

The United States

t

P-1

-0.408

-2.16

-0.379

-1.26

0.119

.983

P-2

-0.323

1.89

-0.391

-1.55

0

.561

I-1

0.317

.891

0.163

.412

0.143

.745

I-2

0.17

1.46

0.054

-.347

-0.143

.951

n=13
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4.2.1 The Establishment
The P-1 index regarding the security establishment decreased between the Parliament and
the De Jure. The P-1 index between the Parliament Era and the De Jure decreased by 295%
from -0.209 to -0.408. Since the establishment topic directly refers to the Egyptian government
and military, the decrease in this index compared to the previous reference point indicates that
the Muslim Brotherhood solidified a trend of viewing the political universe and more hostile
terms throughout the three periods observed. The P-2 index in this era compared to the
Parliament Era decreased by 37% from -0.235 to -0.323. Noticeably, this is a significant negative
shift in the Muslim Brotherhood’s prospects for realizing their fundamental values concerning
the Egyptian government and military. This directly refers to the Brotherhood solidifying a
conflictual strategy when dealing with the establishment.
The I-1 index increased by 107% between the Parliament and the De Jure eras. The
score for the I-1 index for this era are very interesting. Compared to the Parliament era the
direction of the strategy is more cooperative when dealing with the Egyptian government and the
military. The De Jure Era is the period that the Muslim brotherhood solidified itself as a
legitimate and dominant political party in Egypt. As such, the Muslim Brotherhood’s negotiating
power, or rather their view of their negotiating power, could be reflected in this score. The I-2
index followed a similar trend as the I-1 index. The I-2 index increased between the Parliament
and the current era by 95% from 0.087 to 0.17. Again, as with the I-1 index the scores for this
index could correspond to the Muslim Brotherhood’s position within the political universe after
the Arab Spring. Between the Parliament Era and the De Jure Era the Muslim brotherhood’s
decision-making process regarding the first two instrumental belief indices moved towards the
more cooperative and the spectrum.
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4.2.2 Israel
All of the philosophical and instrumental indices measured for the Israel topic showed
trends of decreasing scores throughout all of the eras reviewed. The researcher noticed only a
minor decrease of 1.1% between the Parliament Era and the De Jure Era for the P-1 index. The
views of the Muslim brotherhood regarding the political universe and Israel remained relatively
stable between the Parliament and De Jure eras. The P-2 index for this era had the most
conflictual score thus far with a value of -0.391. The difference between the P-2 indices in the
Parliament and De Jure era was only -4.3%. Like the P-1 index this supports the claim that the
Muslim Brotherhood’s philosophical beliefs regarding Israel remained relatively stagnant and the
same over the last two periods reviewed. Furthermore, this implies that the Muslim Brotherhood
decision making process with respect to the philosophical indices remained relatively impervious
to influence between the two periods.
The Muslim brotherhood’s decision-making process and instrumental beliefs showed
significant decreases between the Parliament Era and the De Jure Era. Compared to the
Parliament Era the I-1 index decreased by 51% from 0.333 to 0.163. Between the Parliament
and the De Jure era the I-2 index decreased by 63% from 0.232 to 0.054. Both the I-1 and I-2
indices showed trends of migrating towards the midpoint of the spectrum regarding the direction
of strategy for the Muslim Brotherhood, and intensity that the Brotherhood will pursue those
tactics. These scores suggest that the organization’s thought process regarding the direction and
utility of strategy began to shift away from a cooperative to approach towards a mixed-methods
approach. While the organization’s operational code with respect to the philosophical indices
remained relatively stable, both of the measured instrumental indices became less cooperative
during this time period.
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4.2.3 The United States
During this time period the P-1 index increased significantly. Compared to the
Parliament era, the P-1 index increased by 222% from 0.037 to 0.119. Since the P-2 index score
for the final era was 0.000, the difference between the previous eras is an increase 100% since
the respective P-2 indices was a negative value. Interestingly the P-1 index indicates that the
Muslim brotherhood began to view the political universe and its relation to the United States in
more cooperative terms within this era. Additionally, the P-2 trend indicates that the Muslim
Brotherhood also viewed the actions of the United States more favorably and optimistically
within this period.
Albeit the philosophical scores increased for this era compared to the preceding era, the
instrumental indices did not follow the same trend. When compared between the Parliament era
the De Jure Era’s I-1 index decreased by 83% from 0.846 to 0.143. As the Muslim
Brotherhood’s view of the political universe and the United States became more cooperative,
their direction of strategy moved away from the cooperative end of the spectrum to a more mixed
methods decision-making process regarding strategy. Like the I-1 index, the I-2 index similarly
decreased when compared to the preceding era. When compared to the Parliament Era the I-2
index significantly decreased by 386% from 0.410 to -0.143. In addition to moving away from
cooperative strategies in the decision-making process, the trend regarding the I-2 index across
these two eras also indicates that the Muslim brotherhood began to disbelieve in the utility of
cooperative action with the United States. This could be the manifestation of unfruitful
discussions with the United States, or because of their new political power, the belief in more
hardline and conflictual strategies.
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4.2.4 Final Thoughts
The scores for the philosophical and instrumental beliefs for the De Jure Era were very
telling, especially when referenced against the preceding era. Holistically the Muslim
Brotherhood displayed a trend of viewing the Israel and the Egyptian security establishment
more conflictual terms. When referenced against the previous era the Muslim Brotherhood’s
operational code towards Israel remained relatively stable and conflictual. Importantly, with
respect to the United States the Muslim Brotherhood viewed the political universe and the
actions of the United States the most cooperatively of all the variables. Additionally, the
operational code results indicated the Brotherhood also anticipated the United States would
pursue its strategies through cooperative means as indicated through the philosophical indices.
This could be indicative of the Muslim Brotherhood anticipating a new administration in the
United States as many of the texts reference President Obama.
With respect to this thesis it is apt and extremely important that holistically the Muslim
Brotherhood views the United States through a cooperative lens. Additionally, since the
organization views the United States in more cooperative terms compared to Israel and the
Egyptian security establishment, it is natural that the United States would be the prime
intermediary between the Brotherhood and the other entities. As the entity that the Brotherhood
views most cooperatively, it is apt to suggest that the United States has the best chances at
leading successful public diplomacy endeavors with the organization. The next section explores
the Muslim Brotherhood’s operational code during a more constrained temporal period; and
because the United States was viewed through the most cooperative lens by the organization,
possible public diplomacy options for the United State to engage the Brotherhood.
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5. Operation Protective Edge and Public Diplomacy Options for the United
States
The nature of public diplomacy in the 21st century has changed. Gone are the days and
prevalence of one-way communication platforms like Voice of America and Radio Free Europe.
For public diplomacy endeavors to be successful in the 21st century, a dialogue is necessary
between the actor and the intended audience. Future public diplomacy endeavors should
incorporate the theories of the strategic issue management process and continue the work started
by the Department of State’s Digital Outreach Team, particularly with respect to the Muslim
Brotherhood. For the purpose of this research only the DOT was evaluated as opposed to other
State Department entities because the DOT’s stated mission is counter terrorist propaganda and
misinformation.97 The SIM process will provide an effective framework for the United States to
engage the Brotherhood, by codifying public diplomacy principals and combining them with 21st
century technologies. The key to both of these approaches is engaging the Muslim Brotherhood,
and theoretically any intended audience, when particularly volatile situations emerge. There are
several contentious philosophical and instrumental beliefs which the Muslim Brotherhood holds
toward the Establishment, Israel, and the United States. An opportunity for the United Sates to
engage the Muslim Brotherhood exists utilizing the Department of State’s Digital Outreach
Team’s methodology of connecting with contentious audiences. Since the Muslim Brotherhood
is no longer the de jure ruling party in Egypt, a public diplomacy approach represents the best
opportunity for engagement since it attempts to involve secondary and tertiary actors within the
political universe into a dialogue.
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In summer 2014 an opportune geo-political situation manifested to utilize both
operational code analysis and public diplomacy/strategic issue management. In July 2014 an
escalation of tensions and belligerent actions between Israel and Hamas led the Israeli Defense
Forces to engage in a full scale naval, aerial, and ground assault on Gaza. The official IDF name
for the military campaign has sparked discord within the international community: Operation
Tzuk Eitan.98 Literally translated, Operation Tzuk Eitan means “Firm Cliff” or “Resolute Cliff.”
Operation Protective Edge represents a unique opportunity for the United States to utilize
Operational Code Analysis and the Strategic Issue Management process. Operation Protective
Edge offers researchers an opportunity to analyze the political rhetoric of the Muslim
Brotherhood utilizing the aforementioned techniques. Analyzing the political rhetoric of the
Brotherhood in regards to Operation Protective Edge would be of particular interest to this
research because the Muslim Brotherhood is Hamas’ ideological father.
The opportunity represented by Operation Protective Edge is multifaceted. Firstly, this
is a highly contentious and volatile geo-political situation; as such, it meets the requirements to
be assessed by the Department of State’s Digital Outreach Team and evaluated using the SIM
process. Broadly, Operation Protective Edge offers an opportunity for researchers and diplomats
to utilize the two major techniques discussed in this paper: Operational Code Analysis and
Strategic Issue Management. While the immediate causes for Operation Protective Edge go back
to April 2014, social media outlets began displaying increased referenced to Israel and Gaza on 8
July 2014.99 This spike in social media references corresponded to the commencement of the
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IDF’s air campaign which, as many social media users suspected, was in preparation for the
IDF’s ground assault into Gaza.
Little evidence could be gathered regarding the work of the more overt Digital Outreach
Team with respect to this particular situation. The conflict and discussion regarding Operation
Protective Edge has surpassed the “going viral phase” and is currently oscillating between the
proactive and reactive phases. There is ample opportunity for groups like the Digital Outreach
Team to conduct operational code research, engage in strategic issue management, and counter
misinformation from both sides of the conflict.100 Evaluating the political rhetoric of the Muslim
Brotherhood regarding the general military operations of Operation Protective Edge would
naturally and most likely yield conflictual and hostile results. More importantly, these results
would have little substantive value for several reasons. Political rhetoric regarding the general
military operations of Operation Protective Edge would be exceedingly broad. This would
inhibit diplomats and researchers from gathering and worthwhile data on the Muslim
Brotherhood political rhetoric. Furthermore, the rhetoric would also be predictably conflictual.
The political rhetoric which was analyzed concerning Operation Protective Edge was
obtained from Ikhwanweb.com (the Muslim Brotherhood’s official English language website).
When utilizing Ikhwanweb.com’s search function, keywords of “Israel,” “Zionism,” “Gaza,” and
“Hamas” were searched within the time parameter of 1 July 2014 and 31 August 2014. Since
Israel and Hamas were the primary belligerents during Operation Protective Edge, only Israel
was used as a variable.
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Table 4 – Operation Protective Edge’s Operational Protective Edge
Period 4 July 2014 to 31 August 2014

Operation Protective Edge

t

P-1

-0.677

1.04

P-2

-0.581

-.826

I-1

0.074

-.984

I-2

0.019

1.16

n=8

Predictably, the P-1 index was on the hostile and conflictual end of the spectrum. In fact,
it was the most conflictual index of both the philosophical and operation indices of all the eras.
At -0.677, the P-1 index is particularly conflictual when compared to the previous reference
points in the Parliament and De Jure eras. As the largest Israeli military incursion in to Gaza in
recent years, it is clear that the Muslim Brotherhood would find others within the political
universe particularly hostile. This partially explains why the P-1 and index was the most
conflictual out of all the periods evaluated. Between the first era the P-1 index decreased by
81%. Compared to the De Jure Era and the present there was a decrease from -0.379 to -0.677 (a
change of 79%). Compared to the VICS results from the “Israel” issue from the first two eras
the Muslim Brotherhood’s view of the political universe (the P-1 index) has become increasingly
more hostile through the decades. During operation protective edge the Muslim Brotherhood
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viewed the political universe with respect to Israel in far more conflictual terms than in the
Parliament and De Jure eras. This great change within the index between the eras can be
explained by the very nature of the issue being inherently conflictual for all parties involved.
When compared to the similar topic in the first period the P-2 index had a difference of
55%, a decrease from -0.375 to -0.581. Between the second era there was difference of 49%, a
decrease from -0.391 to -0.581. As with the P-1 index, the P-2 index showed an increasing
transformation throughout the periods observed. There was relatively little change between the
“Israel” variable between Periods 2 and 3; indicating that the Muslim Brotherhood’s decision
making process regarding the prospects for their fundamental values remained relatively stable
through the Parliament Era the De Jure Era. During Operation Protective Edge, the Muslim
Brotherhood’s operational code regarding P-2 became significantly more pessimistic. This
significantly low P-2 score indicates that that the Muslim Brotherhood viewed Israel’s actions
with political realm far more pessimistically than the preceding two eras. While the first two
eras’ philosophical indices appeared impervious to external influence indicated by their stability,
this the philosophical indices during Operation Protective Edge became significantly more
pessimistic. While many of the text from the two previous eras concerning Israel referenced or
were concerned with Israeli operations within the occupied territories, the size and scope of
Operation Protective edge obviously contributed to the increased conflictual tendencies of the
Muslim Brotherhood with respect to the philosophical indices.
The difference between the I-1 index from the Parliament Era and Operation Protective
Edge was 0.333 to 0.074, a decrease of 77%. And difference between the second era was 0.163
to 0.074, a decrease of 55%. Similar to the two philosophical indices evaluated, the I-1 index
showed a consistent decrease throughout the initial evaluated periods and Operation Protective
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Edge. The I-1 index from the Operation Protective Edge dataset indicates that the direction of
the Muslim Brotherhood tactics became more negative. The I-2 index from this period reveals
the intensity with which Brotherhood is willing to pursue those tactics became the most
conflictual during this period. The I-2 index compared to the first period decreased from 0.144
to 0.019, a difference of 87%. The I-2 index decreased by 65% from the second period from
0.054 to 0.019. While this index still resides within the “cooperative” area of the spectrum, there
is an observable trend the I-2 index became more conflictual throughout the observed periods.
The Muslim Brotherhood’s texts evaluated concerning Operation Protective Edge
indicate that, holistically, the Brotherhood’s operational code was the most conflictual during
this period. All of the philosophical and instrumental indices evaluated showed significant
shifts to the more conflictual end of the spectrum during the decision making process. Further
research into this subject should consider evaluating a highly specific issue regarding Operation
Protective Edge (i.e. treaties). While the Muslim Brotherhood’s Ikhwanweb.com served as a
valuable data source for the operational code analysis, the organization publishes far more social
media posts than it publishes articles on its website. Moreover, social media platforms are the
primary mediums for engagement for public diplomacy strategies and strategic issue
management process in the twenty-first century. Since the Muslim Brotherhood viewed the
United States, comparatively, through the most cooperative lens during the operational code
analysis, social media posts from the Muslim Brotherhood, the Digital Outreach Team, and the
US Embassy Cairo will be evaluated for this section.
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There are likely very few topics as discursive and polarizing as the Israel-Palestine
issue.101 Like many of the political demonstrations of the last five years, the local and global
remonstrations regarding Operation Protective Edge were notable because of the leveraging of
social media platforms. The Wall Street Journal, reported that on the first day that Israel began
the military ground campaign there were 320,000 tweets referencing Gaza.102 From 1 June 2014
to 31 August 2014, the Department of State’s Digital Outreach Team’s official Facebook page
made only one reference to Gaza or Operation Protective Edge on 22 July 2014.103 During the
same time period the US Embassy Cairo’s official Facebook page similarly only made one
mention to Gaza.104 Under its official moniker the Digital Outreach Team only operates a
Facebook page and a YouTube channel. Albeit, the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism
Communications and the Digital Outreach Team do operate a twitter page under the handle
@ThinkAgain_DOS. This twitter account only made two vague references to Gaza during the
same time period.105 The US Embassy Cairo’s Twitter page also made only one reference to
Gaza during the same period.106
These startling low number of social media posts are particularly striking when taken into
context. The Digital Outreach Team’s Facebook page has approximately 120,000 followers,
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102 Orr Hirschaugue, “Israel and Hamas Take Fight to Social Media,” Wall Street Journal (23 July 2014). Accessed
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while the US Embassy Cairo’s Facebook page has 860,000 followers. The US Embassy Cairo’s
Twitter page has 80,000 followers, while @ThinkAgain_DOS has 20,000. With such a
potentially large audiences, it borders on the edge of foolishness for the Digital Outreach Team
or regional embassies to, in essence, ignore an issue as large as Operation Protective Edge. For
public diplomacy to be effective the political actor needs to actively listen and engage the foreign
public. Quite clearly, the United States did not do that through the Department of States social
media platforms.
In August alone the Muslim Brotherhood’s official Twitter page, which has more than
5,000 followers, had over 66 tweets referencing Gaza.107 The Muslim Brotherhood’s official
English account, which has more than 131,000 followers made approximately 50 references to
Gaza during August.108 While operational code analysis was not run on any of the tweets, a
preliminary review of the tweets reveals that many of tweets were highly conflictual and critical
of the Israeli Defense Forces, and the Egyptian military and government. This review consisted
of evaluating the tweets manually and not through ProfilerPlus.
Realizing the importance of social media platforms, over the past four years the Israeli
Defense Force has increased the size of its “new-media group” from five to 40 members.109 The
IDF’s new-media group also posts in five different languages. In August alone, the IDF’s twitter
page, which has 327,000 followers, tweeted about Gaza more than 100 times. A possibly more
relevant comparison for the Digital Outreach Team would be Israel’s Ministry of Foreign
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Affairs’ (MFA) twitter page. However, the MFA’s twitter page has almost five-times fewer
followers with 68,000 people.110 The IDF’s twitter page has a much larger audience and their
“new-media group” more closely resembles the DOT. Therefor the IDF’s twitter page is a much
more relevant data source and comparative reference point for the DOT. The United States’
digital diplomacy is woefully behind that of the Israeli Defense Force. Operation Protective
Edge presented several different opportunities to exercise the strategic issue management process
and fulfill their mission of countering misinformation.
Ascertaining open source trending data on tweets referencing or using Gaza hashtags
proved extremely difficult. Topsy, an open source trending analytics tool specifically designed
to analyze the Twitter platform, provides researchers with a 30 day snapshot to compare the
mentions of up to three different hashtags.111 However, Topsy only allows users to go back 30
days from the present day—which makes retroactively reviewing trends more than 30 days old
extremely difficult. A snapshot (Table-5) of a Topsy trend graph from 22 July 2014 to 20
August 2014 shows the transition between the proactive and reactive phases, and the move to the
“issue receding phase.”112 The trend analysis shows several peaks and hollows during the time
period coinciding with several major events in the military campaign and also support the
Strategic Issue Management theory. As such, the Operation Protective Edge campaign
represented a salient opportunity for the United States to leverage the Strategic Issue
Management process.
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Table 5 – Topsy Tweet Analytics 113

The hashtag “#GazaUnderAttack” was one of the most popular references on Twitter
during the military campaign.114 Often accompanied with these tweets were evocative images of
apparent Israeli military aftereffects in Gaza. BBC News’ social media arm, #BBCtrending,
conducted an analysis of tweet referencing Gaza and discovered that many of the images that
were being circulated were taken as far back as 2009, or were taken from places in Syria and
Iraq.115 What is more, both Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood’s Twitter accounts, either
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posted false or misleading information about the events occurring in Gaza during the military
campaign.116
The United States has established the basic infrastructure to conduct digital diplomacy
(Public Diplomacy 2.0) in the 21st century. This infrastructure, albeit, is not being fully
exploited or utilized. The DOT’s lack of social media posts illustrates that the Israel-Palestine
issue is, ironically, a topic too controversial for the DOT to address. The DOT’s social media
activity did not correspond to the social media trending and viral phases with respect to
Operation Protective Edge; nor did the DOT’s, or other State Department affiliates’, social media
accounts reflect the activity of the Muslim Brotherhood or the IDF. Undoubtedly the DOT has
changing and shifting priorities (the majority the group’s social media posts were about the
Islamic State and Syria and Iraq), but the group still had an unusually low amount of tweets
concerning Operation Protective Edge during the campaign. The DOT’s other primary directive
is to directly counter misinformation related to U.S. national security. Operation Protective Edge
presented the perfect opportunity for the DOT to directly engage in Public Diplomacy 2.0 by
utilizing the SIM process—as the military campaign oscillated through the various trending
stages required for the SIM process.
A more successful example of utilizing the social media platforms during the military
campaign would be the Israeli Defense Force’s Twitter feed.117 The lack of a Twitter posts
drastically curtails the DOT’s social media audience, thereby inhibiting the potential success of
its public diplomacy and strategic communication initiatives. Furthermore, the example of
116
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Operation Protective Edge clearly shows that the public diplomacy apparatuses of the
Department of State completely neglected the theories and foundations of successful public
diplomacy. Importantly, the DOT did not display any of the elements of a successful diplomatic
strategy regarding Operation Protective Edge (i.e. listening, advocacy, international
broadcasting, etc.).
The Digital Outreach Team’s lack of social media posts on an issue of the size and
magnitude of Operation Protective Edge illustrates that the organization is clearly lacking in the
public diplomacy realm. Operation Protective Edge clearly represented an unusually contentious
and conflictual situation for the Muslim Brotherhood as is evident by the organization operation
code. Importantly, Operation Protective Edge also displayed the necessary trends to be
considered for strategic issue management. By engaging the Muslim Brotherhood (and similar
organizations) via social media platforms, the Digital Outreach Team is not only engaging the
Brotherhood, but also the Brotherhood’s social network—which is equally important. By
countering misinformation, such as that presented during Operation Protective Edge, the DOT
could have potentially contributed to changing the opinions of the Muslim Brotherhood and its
digital followers. As shown in the operational code analysis for the Parliament Era and the De
Jure Era, the Muslim Brotherhood view the actions of the United States more positively and
optimistically than that of Israel or the Egyptian government and military. The distinct lack of
engagement with the Muslim Brotherhood by the United States is particularly disappointing.
Operational code analysis and the strategic issue management process could, and should,
be used by diplomats in the future. Several of the documents that were evaluated during the
Parliament and the De Jure eras concerned Israeli military actions in the occupied territories,
albeit on a much smaller scale compare to Operation Protective Edge, and indicated the Muslim
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Brotherhood’s philosophical indices concerning Israel remained quite stable between the two
eras. Operational code analysis further indicates Operation Protective Edge was particularly
evocative and manifested more pessimistic and conflictual beliefs. Operational code analysis
would quantitatively and referentially give diplomats a reference point to begin dialoging with
the Brotherhood—as future analysis could be focused on specific subtopics and not a general
actor. Furthermore, after identifying the decision making process and tendencies of the
organization through operational code analysis, the SIM process can be used to engage on viral
issues by targeting specific audiences (i.e. those within the Muslim Brotherhood’s social
network).
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6. Conclusion
By analyzing master beliefs, this research gleans important and valuable information into
the basic belief system of the Muslim Brotherhood. In regards to the Egyptian security
establishment both philosophical indices saw a distinct shifts toward the conflictual ends of the
spectrum during the period evaluated. The instrumental belief indices saw a decrease between
the first two periods, but an increase during the last periods. With regards to Israel, both of the
Muslim Brotherhood’s philosophical and instrumental beliefs saw a sharp decrease in
cooperativeness and more manifestations of difficultness. Between the Parliament and De Jure
eras, however, the philosophical and instrumental indices remained relatively stable towards the
hostile/conflictual end of the spectrum. The stability of the Brotherhood’s operational code
suggests that the organization’s decision making process was imperviousness to external factors.
Predictably, Operation Protective Edge manifested the lowest and most conflictual scores
evaluated. Interestingly, the Muslim Brotherhood displayed a trend of viewing the political
universe and the United States more cooperatively throughout the last two eras. The direction
and type of strategy when dealing with the United States, however, fluctuated from highly
cooperative in the Parliament Era to less cooperative during the De Jure Era.
Importantly, this research can now provide a basic framework for engaging with Muslim
Brotherhood. Organizationally, the Brotherhood initially displayed a distinct shift to more
conflictual strategies, and an increase in the belief in the utility of those strategies. The Muslim
Brotherhood’s social media activity during Operation Protective Edge also illustrates that the
organization is an active user of social media platforms. With conflictual scores in both
philosophical and instrumental indices, there are multiple opportunities to dialogue with the
Brotherhood. Still being the largest opposition group in Egypt, the Digital Outreach Team failed
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to actively engage with the Brotherhood or directly address the issue during Operation Protective
Edge. Operational code analysis can be combined with the strategic issue management process
to dialogue with the Brotherhood on contentious situations in the 21st century. With contentious
views about the Egyptian establishment and Israel, yet viewing the actions of the United States
as primarily cooperative, the Muslim Brotherhood is a prime target for American Public
Diplomacy 2.0. Showing indications through their operational code that they view the political
universe and the role of the United States with in it positively, the Brotherhood should be a prime
target for agents of Public Diplomacy 2.0, like the Digital Outreach Team.
Operational code analysis and the strategic issue management process are both extremely
powerful tools. Operational code analysis provided insightful information on the decision
making process and the paradigm of the Muslim Brotherhood. The SIM process, although not
used during Operation Protective Edge, provides Public Diplomacy 2.0 with a codified strategy
to engage foreign audiences. This research shows that, comparatively, the United States is the
ideal intermediary between the Brotherhood and Israel and the Egyptian security establishment.
Further, the lack of social media activity suggests the United States should reprioritize it social
media presence and enlarge the Digital Outreach Team (and similar groups) so that it can engage
more audiences. Finally, if used, the SIM process can engage multiple audiences and countermisinformation to timely and viral issues. To properly and effectively engage opposition groups
like the Muslim Brotherhood in the future, the United States is going to need well balanced
strategy, which should include operational code analysis and the strategic issue management
process.
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